Difference of reciprocity effect in two coevolutionary models of presumed two-player and multiplayer games

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

19 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

Unlike other natural network systems, assortativity can be observed in most human social networks; however, it has been reported that a social dilemma situation represented by a 2×2 prisoner's dilemma game favors dissortativity to enhance cooperation. Our simulations successfully reveal that a public goods game with coevolution for both agents' strategy and network topology encourages assortativity, although it only slightly enhances cooperation as compared to a 2×2 donor and recipient game with a strong dilemma to be solved. This outcome occurs because the network dynamics in a multiplayer game discourages emerging cooperation unlike its beneficial result in a 2×2 prisoner's dilemma game.

元の言語英語
記事番号062136
ジャーナルPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
87
発行部数6
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 6 25 2013

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games
Reciprocity
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Game
Social Dilemma
Network Dynamics
Coevolution
Dilemma
Network Topology
Social Networks
Model
emerging
topology
Simulation
simulation

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

これを引用

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