Differentiated standards and patent pools

Aaron Schiff, Reiko Aoki

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

1 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

We consider patent pool formation by owners of essential patents for differentiated standards that may be complements or substitutes in use. Pooling improves coordination in terms of royalty setting within a standard but provokes a strategic response from licensors in the competing standard. We characterise the incentives to form and defect from pools within standards and show how pool formation and stability depend on competition between standards. We also examine strategic patent pool formation by consortium standards and show that policies promoting compatibility of standards may increase or decrease welfare depending on the effects on the incentives to form pools.

元の言語英語
ページ数1
ジャーナルJournal of Industrial Economics
62
発行部数2
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 1 1 2014

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Patent pool
Incentives
Patents
Substitute
Owners
Compatibility
Pooling
Royalty
Defects
Consortium
Strategic response

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

これを引用

Differentiated standards and patent pools. / Schiff, Aaron; Aoki, Reiko.

:: Journal of Industrial Economics, 巻 62, 番号 2, 01.01.2014.

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

Schiff, Aaron ; Aoki, Reiko. / Differentiated standards and patent pools. :: Journal of Industrial Economics. 2014 ; 巻 62, 番号 2.
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