Dilemma game structure observed in traffic flow at a 2-to-1 lane junction

Atsuo Yamauchi, Jun Tanimoto, Aya Hagishima, Hiroki Sagara

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

34 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

Using a cellular automaton traffic model based on the stochastic optimal velocity model with appropriate assumptions for both incoming and outgoing vehicle boundaries, the so-called bottleneck issue on a lane-closing section was investigated in terms of game theory. In the system, two classified driver agents coexist: C agents (cooperative strategy) always driving in the first lane and D agents (defective strategy) trying to drive in a lower-density lane whether the first or the second lane. In high-density flow, D agents' interruption into the first lane from the second just before the lane-closing section creates a heavier traffic jam, which reduces social efficiency. This particular event can be described with a prisoner's dilemma game structure.

元の言語英語
記事番号036104
ジャーナルPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
79
発行部数3
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 3 3 2009

Fingerprint

Dilemma
games
Traffic Flow
traffic
Game
closing
Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Traffic Jam
Heavy Traffic
Traffic Model
Cellular Automaton Model
Game Theory
game theory
Driver
interruption
cellular automata
Model-based
vehicles
Strategy
Model

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Condensed Matter Physics
  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability

これを引用

Dilemma game structure observed in traffic flow at a 2-to-1 lane junction. / Yamauchi, Atsuo; Tanimoto, Jun; Hagishima, Aya; Sagara, Hiroki.

:: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, 巻 79, 番号 3, 036104, 03.03.2009.

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

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