Does copy-resistance enhance cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma?

K. Shigaki, S. Kokubo, J. Tanimoto, A. Hagishima, N. Ikegaya

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

15 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

We propose a novel idea for the so-called pairwise-Fermi process by considering copy-resistance when an agent copies a neighbor's strategy, which implies that the focal agent with relatively affluent payoff vis-à-vis social average might be negative to copy her neighbor's strategy even if her payoff is less than the neighbor's payoff. Simulation results reveal that this idea with a revised strategy adaptation process significantly enhances cooperation for prisoner's dilemma games played on time-constant networks.

元の言語英語
記事番号40008
ジャーナルEPL
98
発行部数4
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 5 1 2012

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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Physics and Astronomy(all)

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