Dynamical behaviors for vaccination can suppress infectious disease – A game theoretical approach

K. M.Ariful Kabir, Jun Tanimoto

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

抄録

To avoid the infection, the epidemic outburst plays a significant role that encourages people to take vaccination and induce behavioral changes. The interplay between disease incidence, vaccine uptake and the behavior of individuals are taking place on the local time scale. Here, we analyze the individual's behavior in disease-vaccination interaction model based on the evolutionary game approach that captures the idea of vaccination decisions on disease prevalence that also include social learning. The effect of herd immunity is partly important when the individuals are deciding whether to take the vaccine or not. The possibility that an individual taking a vaccination or becoming infected depends upon how many other people are vaccinated. To apprehend this interplay, four strategy updating rules: individual based risk assessment (IB-RA), society based risk assessment (SB-RA), direct commitment (DC) and modified replicator dynamics (MRD) are contemplated for game theoretical approach by how one individual can learn from society or neighbors. The theory and findings of this paper provide a new perspective for vaccination taking policy in daily basis that provision of prompt learning with the collective information reliefs to reduce infection, which gives a new ‘vaccination game’ from other previous models.

元の言語英語
ページ(範囲)229-239
ページ数11
ジャーナルChaos, solitons and fractals
123
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 6 1 2019

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Vaccination
Infectious Diseases
games
infectious diseases
Dynamical Behavior
vaccines
risk assessment
Vaccines
Game
Risk assessment
learning
Vaccine
immunity
Risk Assessment
Infection
incidence
Replicator Dynamics
Social Learning
Evolutionary Game
Local Time

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Mathematics(all)

これを引用

Dynamical behaviors for vaccination can suppress infectious disease – A game theoretical approach. / Kabir, K. M.Ariful; Tanimoto, Jun.

:: Chaos, solitons and fractals, 巻 123, 01.06.2019, p. 229-239.

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

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