Effect of a large gaming neighborhood and a strategy adaptation neighborhood for bolstering network reciprocity in a prisoner's dilemma game

Takashi Ogasawara, Jun Tanimoto, Eriko Fukuda, Aya Hagishima, Naoki Ikegaya

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

23 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In 22 prisoner's dilemma (PD) games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, leading to a cooperative equilibrium. In this paper, we explain how gaming neighborhoods and strategy-adaptation neighborhoods affect network reciprocity independently in spatial PD games. We explore an appropriate range of strategy adaptation neighborhoods as opposed to the conventional method of making the gaming and strategy adaptation neighborhoods coincide to enhance the level of cooperation. In cases of expanding gaming neighborhoods, network reciprocity falls to a low level relative to the conventional setting. In the discussion below, which is based on the results of our simulation, we explore how these enhancements come about. Essentially, varying the range of the neighborhoods influences how cooperative clusters form and expand in the evolutionary process.

本文言語英語
論文番号P12024
ジャーナルJournal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
2014
12
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 12 1 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 統計物理学および非線形物理学
  • 統計学および確率
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

フィンガープリント

「Effect of a large gaming neighborhood and a strategy adaptation neighborhood for bolstering network reciprocity in a prisoner's dilemma game」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル