### 抄録

Recently, a new vaccination game model was proposed, where an intermediate defense measure besides two fundamental strategies; committing vaccination that leads to a perfect immunity and not committing vaccination, was introduced as third strategy. We explore what happens if both effectiveness and cost of an intermediate defense measure stochastically perturbing on the viewpoint of whether or not the third strategy helping to improve total social payoff. We found that unlike resonance effect by adding noise to payoff matrix in case of spatial prisoner's dilemma (SPD) games, adding time-varying noise on both effectiveness and cost does not make difference from the default setting without perturbation to the third strategy. However, if the noise initially given to each agent is frozen, we found the third strategy becoming robust to survive. In particular, if the strategy updating rule allows a more advantageous third strategy can be more commonly shared among agents through copying, the total social payoff is significantly improved.

元の言語 | 英語 |
---|---|

ページ（範囲） | 337-341 |

ページ数 | 5 |

ジャーナル | Chaos, solitons and fractals |

巻 | 106 |

DOI | |

出版物ステータス | 出版済み - 1 1 2018 |

### Fingerprint

### All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

- Mathematics(all)

### これを引用

**Effect of noise-perturbing intermediate defense measures in voluntary vaccination games.** / Ida, Yuki; Tanimoto, Jun.

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿 › 記事

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Effect of noise-perturbing intermediate defense measures in voluntary vaccination games

AU - Ida, Yuki

AU - Tanimoto, Jun

PY - 2018/1/1

Y1 - 2018/1/1

N2 - Recently, a new vaccination game model was proposed, where an intermediate defense measure besides two fundamental strategies; committing vaccination that leads to a perfect immunity and not committing vaccination, was introduced as third strategy. We explore what happens if both effectiveness and cost of an intermediate defense measure stochastically perturbing on the viewpoint of whether or not the third strategy helping to improve total social payoff. We found that unlike resonance effect by adding noise to payoff matrix in case of spatial prisoner's dilemma (SPD) games, adding time-varying noise on both effectiveness and cost does not make difference from the default setting without perturbation to the third strategy. However, if the noise initially given to each agent is frozen, we found the third strategy becoming robust to survive. In particular, if the strategy updating rule allows a more advantageous third strategy can be more commonly shared among agents through copying, the total social payoff is significantly improved.

AB - Recently, a new vaccination game model was proposed, where an intermediate defense measure besides two fundamental strategies; committing vaccination that leads to a perfect immunity and not committing vaccination, was introduced as third strategy. We explore what happens if both effectiveness and cost of an intermediate defense measure stochastically perturbing on the viewpoint of whether or not the third strategy helping to improve total social payoff. We found that unlike resonance effect by adding noise to payoff matrix in case of spatial prisoner's dilemma (SPD) games, adding time-varying noise on both effectiveness and cost does not make difference from the default setting without perturbation to the third strategy. However, if the noise initially given to each agent is frozen, we found the third strategy becoming robust to survive. In particular, if the strategy updating rule allows a more advantageous third strategy can be more commonly shared among agents through copying, the total social payoff is significantly improved.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85037524150&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85037524150&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.chaos.2017.11.031

DO - 10.1016/j.chaos.2017.11.031

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85037524150

VL - 106

SP - 337

EP - 341

JO - Chaos, Solitons and Fractals

JF - Chaos, Solitons and Fractals

SN - 0960-0779

ER -