取引における認証制度の有効性:─安全基準に対する信頼の観点から─

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

抄録

This paper try to theoretically bring out the problems occurred when food safety signals, which are used safety standard or certification, are incompletely transmitted to buyers. Theoretical analysis of transaction game model without restriction for rational belief can explain following situations. Firstly, consumer attitude of untrustworthiness of food safety has a certain amount of rationality. Secondly, after strengthening of food sanitary inspection at upper stream of food distribution channel, the information of inspection results mislead harmful rumor. Thirdly, q excessively high or low belief of normal food spoils the effect of introducing food safety certification. Results indicate that food safety standard or certification needs proper belief control in applicable methods.
寄稿の翻訳タイトルEffectiveness of Certification System in Transaction:From the Standpoint of the Belief of Safety Standard
本文言語Japanese
ページ(範囲)83-95
ページ数13
ジャーナルフードシステム研究
20
2
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2013

フィンガープリント 「取引における認証制度の有効性:─安全基準に対する信頼の観点から─」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル