Inspired by the commonly observed real-world fact that people tend to behave in a somewhat random manner after facing interim equilibrium to break a stalemate situation whilst seeking a higher output, we established two models of the spatial prisoner's dilemma. One presumes that an agent commits action errors, while the other assumes that an agent refers to a payoff matrix with an added random noise instead of an original payoff matrix. A numerical simulation revealed that mechanisms based on the annealing of randomness due to either the action error or the payoff noise could significantly enhance the cooperation fraction. In this study, we explain the detailed enhancement mechanism behind the two models by referring to the concepts that we previously presented with respect to evolutionary dynamic processes under the names of enduring and expanding periods.
|ジャーナル||Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications|
|出版物ステータス||出版済み - 11 15 2016|
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Statistics and Probability
- Condensed Matter Physics