TY - GEN
T1 - False-name-proof facility location on discrete structures
AU - Todo, Taiki
AU - Okada, Nodoka
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
N1 - Funding Information:
This work is partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grants JP17H00761 and JP17H04695, and JST SICORP JPMJSC1607. The authors thank Ilan Nehama and Yuho Wada for their contribution and useful comments on the initial stage of this project. All errors are our own.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The authors and IOS Press.
PY - 2020/8/24
Y1 - 2020/8/24
N2 - We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a given graph based on agents' preferences, where the domain of the preferences is either single-peaked or single-dipped, depending on whether they want to access the facility (a public good) or be far from it (a public bad). Our main interest is the existence of deterministic social choice functions that are Pareto efficient and false-name-proof, i.e., resistant to fake votes. We show that regardless of whether preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped, such a social choice function exists (i) for any tree graph, and (ii) for a cycle graph if and only if its length is less than six. We also show that when the preferences are single-peaked, such a social choice function exists for any ladder (i.e., 2 × m grid) graph, and does not exist for any larger (hyper)grid.
AB - We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a given graph based on agents' preferences, where the domain of the preferences is either single-peaked or single-dipped, depending on whether they want to access the facility (a public good) or be far from it (a public bad). Our main interest is the existence of deterministic social choice functions that are Pareto efficient and false-name-proof, i.e., resistant to fake votes. We show that regardless of whether preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped, such a social choice function exists (i) for any tree graph, and (ii) for a cycle graph if and only if its length is less than six. We also show that when the preferences are single-peaked, such a social choice function exists for any ladder (i.e., 2 × m grid) graph, and does not exist for any larger (hyper)grid.
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U2 - 10.3233/FAIA200097
DO - 10.3233/FAIA200097
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85091756641
T3 - Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
SP - 227
EP - 234
BT - ECAI 2020 - 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, including 10th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence, PAIS 2020 - Proceedings
A2 - De Giacomo, Giuseppe
A2 - Catala, Alejandro
A2 - Dilkina, Bistra
A2 - Milano, Michela
A2 - Barro, Senen
A2 - Bugarin, Alberto
A2 - Lang, Jerome
PB - IOS Press BV
T2 - 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2020, including 10th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence, PAIS 2020
Y2 - 29 August 2020 through 8 September 2020
ER -