False-name-proof locations of two facilities: Economic and algorithmic approaches

Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

11 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper considers a mechanism design problem for locating two identical facilities on an interval, in which an agent can pretend to be multiple agents. A mechanism selects a pair of locations on the interval according to the declared singlepeaked preferences of agents. An agent's utility is determined by the location of the better one (typically the closer to her ideal point). This model can represent various application domains. For example, assume a company is going to release two models of its product line and performs a questionnaire survey in an online forum to determine their detailed specs. Typically, a customer will buy only one model, but she can answer multiple times by logging onto the forum under several email accounts. We first characterize possible outcomes of mechanisms that satisfy false-name-proofness, as well as some mild conditions. By extending the result, we completely characterize the class of false-name-proof mechanisms when locating two facilities on a circle.We then clarify the approximation ratios of the false-name-proof mechanisms on a line metric for the social and maximum costs. 1 Introduction.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトル30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
出版社AAAI Press
ページ615-621
ページ数7
ISBN(電子版)9781577357605
出版ステータス出版済み - 2016
イベント30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016 - Phoenix, 米国
継続期間: 2 12 20162 17 2016

出版物シリーズ

名前30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016

その他

その他30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2016
国/地域米国
CityPhoenix
Period2/12/162/17/16

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能

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