False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team

Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Yasumasa Saito, Mahyar Salek, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: 書籍/レポート タイプへの寄稿会議への寄与

5 被引用数 (Scopus)


We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purchase a feasible solution by conducting an auction. Our goal is to design auctions that are truthful and false-name-proof, meaning that it is in the agents' best interest to reveal ownership of all elements (which may not be known to the auctioneer a priori) as well as their true incurred costs.We first propose and analyze a false-name-proof mechanism for the special cases where each agent owns only one element in reality. We prove that its frugality ratio is bounded by n2n, which nearly matches a lower bound of Ω(2n) for all false-name-proof mechanisms in this scenario. We then propose a second mechanism. It requires the auctioneer to choose a reserve cost a priori, and thus does not always purchase a solution. In return, it is false-name-proof even when agents own multiple elements. We experimentally evaluate the payment (as well as social surplus) of the second mechanism through simulation.

ホスト出版物のタイトルInternet and Network Economics - Third International Workshop, WINE 2007, Proceedings
出版社Springer Verlag
出版ステータス出版済み - 2007
イベント3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2007 - San Diego, CA, 米国
継続期間: 12月 12 200712月 14 2007


名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
4858 LNCS


その他3rd International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2007
CitySan Diego, CA

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 理論的コンピュータサイエンス
  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)


「False-name-proof mechanisms for hiring a team」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。