Games of corruption: How to suppress illegal logging

Joung Hun Lee, Karl Sigmund, Ulf Dieckmann, Yoh Iwasa

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

20 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

Corruption is one of the most serious obstacles for ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation. In particular, more than half of the loss of forested area in many tropical countries is due to illegal logging, with corruption implicated in a lack of enforcement. Here we study an evolutionary game model to analyze the illegal harvesting of forest trees, coupled with the corruption of rule enforcers. We consider several types of harvesters, who may or may not be committed towards supporting an enforcer service, and who may cooperate (log legally) or defect (log illegally). We also consider two types of rule enforcers, honest and corrupt: while honest enforcers fulfill their function, corrupt enforcers accept bribes from defecting harvesters and refrain from fining them. We report three key findings. First, in the absence of strategy exploration, the harvester-enforcer dynamics are bistable: one continuum of equilibria consists of defecting harvesters and a low fraction of honest enforcers, while another consists of cooperating harvesters and a high fraction of honest enforcers. Both continua attract nearby strategy mixtures. Second, even a small rate of strategy exploration removes this bistability, rendering one of the outcomes globally stable. It is the relative rate of exploration among enforcers that then determines whether most harvesters cooperate or defect and most enforcers are honest or corrupt, respectively. This suggests that the education of enforcers, causing their more frequent trialing of honest conduct, can be a potent means of curbing corruption. Third, if information on corrupt enforcers is available, and players react opportunistically to it, the domain of attraction of cooperative outcomes widens considerably. We conclude by discussing policy implications of our results.

元の言語英語
ページ(範囲)1-13
ページ数13
ジャーナルJournal of Theoretical Biology
367
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 2 1 2015

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Harvesters
harvesters
logging
Game
Biodiversity
Continuum
Defects
Ecosystem
Evolutionary Game
Bistability
Domain of Attraction
Harvesting
Education
Rendering
Conservation
ecosystem management
rendering
forest trees
Ecosystems
cooperatives

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Immunology and Microbiology(all)
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

これを引用

Games of corruption : How to suppress illegal logging. / Lee, Joung Hun; Sigmund, Karl; Dieckmann, Ulf; Iwasa, Yoh.

:: Journal of Theoretical Biology, 巻 367, 01.02.2015, p. 1-13.

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

Lee, Joung Hun ; Sigmund, Karl ; Dieckmann, Ulf ; Iwasa, Yoh. / Games of corruption : How to suppress illegal logging. :: Journal of Theoretical Biology. 2015 ; 巻 367. pp. 1-13.
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