Generalized vickrey auction and suppression of active adversary using incentive-compatible implementation

Makoto Yokoo, Koutarou Suzuki

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

抄録

This paper presents an attempt to make rational active adversary passive using mechanism design. We propose a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme where the procedure executed by a bidder affects neither the prices nor the allocation of the bidder. Therefore, a bidder does not have an incentive to be an active adversary.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)255-261
ページ数7
ジャーナルIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
E88-A
1
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 1 2005

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

フィンガープリント 「Generalized vickrey auction and suppression of active adversary using incentive-compatible implementation」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル