Generalizing envy-freeness toward group of agents

Taiki Todo, Runcong Li, Xuemei Hu, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

14 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Envy-freeness is a well-known fairness concept for analyzing mechanisms. Its traditional definition requires that no individual envies another individual. However, an individual (or a group of agents) may envy another group, even if she (or they) does not envy another individual. In mechanisms with monetary transfer, such as combinatorial auctions, considering such fairness requirements, which are refinements of traditional envy-freeness, is meaningful and brings up a new interesting research direction in mechanism design. In this paper, we introduce two new concepts of fairness called envy-freeness of an individual toward a group, and envy-freeness of a group toward a group . They are natural extensions of traditional envy-freeness. We discuss combinatorial auction mechanisms that satisfy these concepts. First, we characterize such mechanisms by focusing on their allocation rules. Then we clarify the connections between these concepts and three other properties: the core, strategy-proofness, and false-name-proofness.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルIJCAI 2011 - 22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ページ386-392
ページ数7
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2011
イベント22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2011 - Barcelona, Catalonia, スペイン
継続期間: 7 16 20117 22 2011

出版物シリーズ

名前IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN(印刷版)1045-0823

その他

その他22nd International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2011
国/地域スペイン
CityBarcelona, Catalonia
Period7/16/117/22/11

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能

引用スタイル