How does resolution of strategy affect network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games?

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿学術誌査読

10 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In the canonical framework of evolutionary 2 × 2 games, a binary strategy set comprising cooperation (C) and defection (D) has usually been presumed. Inspired by commonly observed real-world facts, we explore what happens if the resolution of strategy increases. As an extreme limit, the infinite resolution case is both a continuous and a mixed strategy defined by a real number in the range of [0,1]. We find that increasing resolution amplifies cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games as compared with the binary strategy definition; however, this enhancement tendency with increasing resolution is not monotonic in the case of a mixed-strategy setting.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)36-42
ページ数7
ジャーナルApplied Mathematics and Computation
301
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 5月 15 2017

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 計算数学
  • 応用数学

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