TY - JOUR

T1 - How does resolution of strategy affect network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games?

AU - Tanimoto, Jun

PY - 2017/5/15

Y1 - 2017/5/15

N2 - In the canonical framework of evolutionary 2 × 2 games, a binary strategy set comprising cooperation (C) and defection (D) has usually been presumed. Inspired by commonly observed real-world facts, we explore what happens if the resolution of strategy increases. As an extreme limit, the infinite resolution case is both a continuous and a mixed strategy defined by a real number in the range of [0,1]. We find that increasing resolution amplifies cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games as compared with the binary strategy definition; however, this enhancement tendency with increasing resolution is not monotonic in the case of a mixed-strategy setting.

AB - In the canonical framework of evolutionary 2 × 2 games, a binary strategy set comprising cooperation (C) and defection (D) has usually been presumed. Inspired by commonly observed real-world facts, we explore what happens if the resolution of strategy increases. As an extreme limit, the infinite resolution case is both a continuous and a mixed strategy defined by a real number in the range of [0,1]. We find that increasing resolution amplifies cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games as compared with the binary strategy definition; however, this enhancement tendency with increasing resolution is not monotonic in the case of a mixed-strategy setting.

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U2 - 10.1016/j.amc.2016.11.036

DO - 10.1016/j.amc.2016.11.036

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85007170306

VL - 301

SP - 36

EP - 42

JO - Applied Mathematics and Computation

JF - Applied Mathematics and Computation

SN - 0096-3003

ER -