TY - JOUR
T1 - Implementing a strategyproof greedy-allocation combinatorial auction and extending to ascending auction
AU - Ito, Takayuki
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
AU - Matsubara, Shigeo
AU - Iwasaki, Atsushi
PY - 2007/8
Y1 - 2007/8
N2 - This paper proposes a new combinatorial auction protocol called Average-Max-Minimal-Bundle (AM-MB) protocol. The characteristics of the AM-MB protocol are as follows: (i) it is strategyproof, that is, truth-telling is a dominant strategy, (ii) the computational overhead is very low, since it allocates bundles greedily thereby avoiding an explicit combinatorial optimization problem, and (iii) it can obtain higher social surplus and revenue than can the Max-Minimal-Bundle (M-MB) protocol, which also satisfies (i) and (ii). Furthermore, this paper extends the AM-MB protocol to an open ascending-price protocol in which straight-forward bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium.
AB - This paper proposes a new combinatorial auction protocol called Average-Max-Minimal-Bundle (AM-MB) protocol. The characteristics of the AM-MB protocol are as follows: (i) it is strategyproof, that is, truth-telling is a dominant strategy, (ii) the computational overhead is very low, since it allocates bundles greedily thereby avoiding an explicit combinatorial optimization problem, and (iii) it can obtain higher social surplus and revenue than can the Max-Minimal-Bundle (M-MB) protocol, which also satisfies (i) and (ii). Furthermore, this paper extends the AM-MB protocol to an open ascending-price protocol in which straight-forward bidding is an ex-post Nash equilibrium.
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U2 - 10.1002/scj.20748
DO - 10.1002/scj.20748
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:34249930061
VL - 38
SP - 44
EP - 51
JO - Systems and Computers in Japan
JF - Systems and Computers in Japan
SN - 0882-1666
IS - 9
ER -