Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism

Sung Ho Cho, Miyuki Koshimura, Pinaki Mandal, Kentaro Yahiro, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿学術誌査読

抄録

Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. When the set of feasible matchings is restricted by some distributional constraints, a stable matching may not exist. In contrast, a weakly stable matching is guaranteed to exist under a very general class of constraints that satisfies a condition called heredity. However, it has been an open question whether a weakly stable matching can be obtained by a strategy-proof mechanism. We negatively answer this open question; no weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists under any heredity feasibility constraint in general.

本文言語英語
論文番号110675
ジャーナルEconomics Letters
217
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 8月 2022

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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