Individually rational strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference sets

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

抄録

We consider a social choice problem where individual rationality is required. The status quo belongs to the outcome space, and the selected alternative must be weakly better than the status quo for everybody. If the mechanism designer has no knowledge of the alternatives, we obtain a negative result: any individually rational (IR) and strategy-proof (SP) mechanism can choose at most one alternative (besides the status quo), regardless of the preferences. To overcome this negative result, we consider a domain where the alternatives have a known structure, i.e., an agent is indifferent between the status quo and a subset of the outcomes. This set is exogenously given and public information. This assumption is natural if the social choice involves the participation of agents. For example, consider a group of people organizing a trip where participation is voluntary. We can assume each agent is indifferent between the trip plans in which she does not participate and the status quo (i.e., no trip). In this setting, we obtain more positive results: we develop a class of mechanisms called Approve and Choose mechanisms, which are IR and SP, and can choose multiple alternatives as well as the status quo.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルPrinciles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems - 19th International Conference, PRIMA 2016, Proceedings
編集者Matteo Baldoni, Katsutoshi Hirayama, Paolo Torroni, Tran Cao Son, Amit K. Chopra
出版社Springer Verlag
ページ181-196
ページ数16
ISBN(印刷版)9783319448312
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2016
イベント19th International Conference on Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2016 - Phuket, タイ
継続期間: 8 22 20168 26 2016

出版物シリーズ

名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
9862 LNCS
ISSN(印刷版)0302-9743
ISSN(電子版)1611-3349

その他

その他19th International Conference on Princiles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2016
国/地域タイ
CityPhuket
Period8/22/168/26/16

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 理論的コンピュータサイエンス
  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)

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