International environmental agreements between asymmetric countries: A repeated game analysis

Nobuyuki Takashima

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper introduces a new approach to performing a relaxed analysis using a repeated game to achieve an international environmental agreement (IEA) with the full participation of countries when an asymmetric relationship exists with respect to emissions-related benefits and environmental damage. Our model reveals that a stable IEA depends on the magnitude of the relationship between the benefit-cost ratios of the two types of countries, not on their compositions. That is, the number of punishing countries for a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium depends on the benefit-cost ratios of the two types of countries. Our results show that a global cooperation on abatement among the two types of countries can be achieved by addressing deviation through flexibly selecting punishing countries based on benefit-cost ratios.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)38-44
ページ数7
ジャーナルJapan and the World Economy
48
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 12 2018

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 政治学と国際関係論

フィンガープリント

「International environmental agreements between asymmetric countries: A repeated game analysis」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル