International environmental agreements with ancillary benefits: Repeated games analysis

Nobuyuki Takashima

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

6 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Both ancillary and primary benefits, generated by climate change mitigation, are indispensable key factors to implement the full participation in international environmental agreement (IEA). This paper presents a new IEA model with ancillary benefits, using a repeated game with the linear and quadratic emission abatement cost functions of each country. This study also investigates the effect of ancillary benefits on the condition for full participation in IEA. Ancillary benefits function as a complementary device of punishment scheme for IEA. Our main results show that ancillary benefits can facilitate full participation in IEA, thus suggesting that they should be considered in climate change negotiations.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)312-320
ページ数9
ジャーナルEconomic Modelling
61
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2 1 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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