License scheme: An optimal waste management policy under asymmetric information

Takayoshi Shinkuma, Shunsuke Managi

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿学術誌査読

4 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

A system requiring a waste management license from an enforcement agency has been introduced in many countries. A license system is usually coupled with fines, a manifest, and a disposal tax. However, these policy devices have not been integrated into an optimal policy. In this paper we derive an optimal waste management policy by using those policy devices. Waste management policies are met with three difficult problems: asymmetric information, the heterogeneity of waste management firms, and non-compliance by waste management firms and waste disposers. The optimal policy in this paper overcomes all three problems.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)143-168
ページ数26
ジャーナルJournal of Regulatory Economics
39
2
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 3月 2011
外部発表はい

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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