Like father, like son: Who creates listed subsidiaries?

Hichem Boulifa, Konari Uchida

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿学術誌査読

抄録

Equity carve-outs and spin-offs generate listed subsidiaries that embrace conflicts of interests between controlling and minority shareholders. We find robust evidence that long-tenure managers tend to conduct these asset divestitures, especially when the divesting firm has a concentrated ownership structure. The result suggests that managers with the opportunity to extract private benefits establish entities that provide such opportunities. Meanwhile, large shareholders prevent managers from conducting these divestitures when they have sufficiently large cash flow rights. We find no evidence that firms launching listed subsidiaries achieve better financial outcomes than asset sell-off firms. Problematic entities in corporate governance further create such entities.

本文言語英語
論文番号101205
ジャーナルJournal of the Japanese and International Economies
64
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 6月 2022

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 政治学と国際関係論

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