Mechanism design for housing markets over social networks

Takehiro Kawasaki, Ryoji Wada, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper we investigate the effect of an underlying social network over agents in a well-known multi-agent resource allocation problem; the housing market. We first show that, when a housing market takes place over a social network with more than two agents and these agents have an option to avoid forwarding information about it to their followers, there does not exist an exchange mechanism that simultaneously satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, and individual rationality. It is also impossible to find a strategy-proof exchange mechanism that always chooses an outcome in a weakened core. These results highlight the difficulty of taking into account the agents’ incentive of information diffusion in the resource allocation. To overcome these negative results, we consider two different ways of restricting the problem; limiting the domain of preferences and the structure of social networks.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトル20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021
出版社International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
ページ692-700
ページ数9
ISBN(電子版)9781713832621
出版ステータス出版済み - 2021
イベント20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021 - Virtual, Online
継続期間: 5 3 20215 7 2021

出版物シリーズ

名前Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
2
ISSN(印刷版)1548-8403
ISSN(電子版)1558-2914

会議

会議20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2021
CityVirtual, Online
Period5/3/215/7/21

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能
  • ソフトウェア
  • 制御およびシステム工学

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