On characterizing economic-based incentive-compatible mechanisms to solving hidden information and hidden action in ad hoc network

Yufeng Wang, Yoshiaki Hori, Kouichi Sakurai

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

抄録

This paper attempts to comprehensively characterize economic-based incentive compatible routing and forwarding mechanisms in ad hoc network, including hidden information in routing phase, and hidden action in forwarding phase. By incentive compatibility it means that system designer should respect rationality of nodes, and design proper incentive mechanisms to encourage nodes to conduct something beneficial to the whole system, while nodes pursued their own utility. Firstly, based on analysis of extensive game form, we argue that, for each participant, truth-telling is the expected dominant strategy equilibrium in VCG-like routing mechanism, even under the situation of mutually dependent link cost. Then, Individual rationality (IR) and Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints are formally offered, which should be satisfied by any game theoretical routing and forwarding scheme. And different solution concepts are investigated to characterize the economic meanings of two kind forwarding approaches, that is, Nash equilibrium with no per-hop monitoring and dominant strategy equilibrium with per-hop monitoring. Finally, we discuss frugality problem in VCG-like mechanism.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルUbiquitous Intelligence and Computing - 4th International Conference, UIC 2007, Proceedings
出版社Springer Verlag
ページ382-391
ページ数10
ISBN(印刷版)9783540735489
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2007
イベント4th International Conference on Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing: Building Smart Worlds in Real and Cyber Spaces, UIC 2007 - Hong Kong, 香港
継続期間: 7 11 20077 13 2007

出版物シリーズ

名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
4611 LNCS
ISSN(印刷版)0302-9743
ISSN(電子版)1611-3349

その他

その他4th International Conference on Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing: Building Smart Worlds in Real and Cyber Spaces, UIC 2007
国/地域香港
CityHong Kong
Period7/11/077/13/07

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 理論的コンピュータサイエンス
  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)

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