抄録
Recently John Dewey scholars such as David Hildebrand have made some ambitious claims about the capacity of Deweyan pragmatism to transcend the contemporary realism/anti- realism debate. I demonstrate that in one part of this debate, concerning the reality of the past, Deweyan pragmatism shares too many affi nities with anti- realism to justify Hildebrand's claims. These affi nities should not weaken the appeal of a pragmatist philosophy of the past (including the historical past). However, I argue that this philosophy needs to be supported by a stronger realism concerning the data from which-on the pragmatist and anti- realist understanding-the past is inferentially reconstructed.
| 元の言語 | 英語 |
|---|---|
| ページ（範囲） | 401-422 |
| ページ数 | 22 |
| ジャーナル | Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society |
| 巻 | 46 |
| 発行部数 | 3 |
| DOI | |
| 出版物ステータス | 出版済み - 1 1 2010 |
| 外部発表 | Yes |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
これを引用
Pragmatism and Anti- realism about the past. / Odwyer, Shaun Richard.
：: Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society, 巻 46, 番号 3, 01.01.2010, p. 401-422.研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿 › 記事
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Pragmatism and Anti- realism about the past
AU - Odwyer, Shaun Richard
PY - 2010/1/1
Y1 - 2010/1/1
N2 - Recently John Dewey scholars such as David Hildebrand have made some ambitious claims about the capacity of Deweyan pragmatism to transcend the contemporary realism/anti- realism debate. I demonstrate that in one part of this debate, concerning the reality of the past, Deweyan pragmatism shares too many affi nities with anti- realism to justify Hildebrand's claims. These affi nities should not weaken the appeal of a pragmatist philosophy of the past (including the historical past). However, I argue that this philosophy needs to be supported by a stronger realism concerning the data from which-on the pragmatist and anti- realist understanding-the past is inferentially reconstructed.
AB - Recently John Dewey scholars such as David Hildebrand have made some ambitious claims about the capacity of Deweyan pragmatism to transcend the contemporary realism/anti- realism debate. I demonstrate that in one part of this debate, concerning the reality of the past, Deweyan pragmatism shares too many affi nities with anti- realism to justify Hildebrand's claims. These affi nities should not weaken the appeal of a pragmatist philosophy of the past (including the historical past). However, I argue that this philosophy needs to be supported by a stronger realism concerning the data from which-on the pragmatist and anti- realist understanding-the past is inferentially reconstructed.
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U2 - 10.2979/tra.2010.46.3.401
DO - 10.2979/tra.2010.46.3.401
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:79959282136
VL - 46
SP - 401
EP - 422
JO - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
JF - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
SN - 0009-1774
IS - 3
ER -