Referring to the social performance promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games

Keizo Shigaki, Jun Tanimoto, Zhen Wang, Satoshi Kokubo, Aya Hagishima, Naoki Ikegaya

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

72 引用 (Scopus)

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We propose a new pairwise Fermi updating rule by considering a social average payoff when an agent copies a neighbor's strategy. In the update rule, a focal agent compares her payoff with the social average payoff of the same strategy that her pairwise opponent has. This concept might be justified by the fact that people reference global and, somehow, statistical information, not local information when imitating social behaviors. We presume several possible ways for the social average. Simulation results prove that the social average of some limited agents realizes more significant cooperation than that of the entire population.

元の言語英語
記事番号031141
ジャーナルPhysical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
86
発行部数3
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 9 26 2012

    フィンガープリント

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

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