Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation

Hiromu Ito, Jun Tanimoto

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

83 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD-GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules are indeed quite different for the resolution (relaxation) of the two dilemmas. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.

本文言語英語
論文番号181085
ジャーナルRoyal Society Open Science
5
10
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 10 1 2018

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 一般

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