Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation

Shinya Shinozaki, Hiroshi Moriyasu, Konari Uchida

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

2 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

Stock options are used only sparingly in Japan. Japanese firms are more likely to adopt new stock option plans when they are more (less) owned by arms-length investors (stable and controlling shareholders). Those firms have significantly more independent boards and pay higher dividends surrounding the adoption year than their industry peers. These results suggest that firms adopting stock options endeavor to meet demands for good governance practice from arms-length shareholders and to follow good governance practices in other dimensions. The coexistence of arms-length, stable, and controlling shareholders generates a situation in which stock options are not widely used in Japan.

元の言語英語
ページ(範囲)1719-1738
ページ数20
ジャーナルJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
51
発行部数5
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 10 1 2016

Fingerprint

Stock options
Shareholders
Managerial compensation
Japan
Controlling shareholders
Dividends
Investors
Industry
Coexistence
Peers
Japanese firms

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

これを引用

Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation. / Shinozaki, Shinya; Moriyasu, Hiroshi; Uchida, Konari.

:: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 巻 51, 番号 5, 01.10.2016, p. 1719-1738.

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

Shinozaki, Shinya ; Moriyasu, Hiroshi ; Uchida, Konari. / Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation. :: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2016 ; 巻 51, 番号 5. pp. 1719-1738.
@article{802f600d9c844fbc8bcda3b4afc4b07c,
title = "Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation",
abstract = "Stock options are used only sparingly in Japan. Japanese firms are more likely to adopt new stock option plans when they are more (less) owned by arms-length investors (stable and controlling shareholders). Those firms have significantly more independent boards and pay higher dividends surrounding the adoption year than their industry peers. These results suggest that firms adopting stock options endeavor to meet demands for good governance practice from arms-length shareholders and to follow good governance practices in other dimensions. The coexistence of arms-length, stable, and controlling shareholders generates a situation in which stock options are not widely used in Japan.",
author = "Shinya Shinozaki and Hiroshi Moriyasu and Konari Uchida",
year = "2016",
month = "10",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1017/S0022109016000636",
language = "English",
volume = "51",
pages = "1719--1738",
journal = "Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis",
issn = "0022-1090",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "5",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Shareholder Composition and Managerial Compensation

AU - Shinozaki, Shinya

AU - Moriyasu, Hiroshi

AU - Uchida, Konari

PY - 2016/10/1

Y1 - 2016/10/1

N2 - Stock options are used only sparingly in Japan. Japanese firms are more likely to adopt new stock option plans when they are more (less) owned by arms-length investors (stable and controlling shareholders). Those firms have significantly more independent boards and pay higher dividends surrounding the adoption year than their industry peers. These results suggest that firms adopting stock options endeavor to meet demands for good governance practice from arms-length shareholders and to follow good governance practices in other dimensions. The coexistence of arms-length, stable, and controlling shareholders generates a situation in which stock options are not widely used in Japan.

AB - Stock options are used only sparingly in Japan. Japanese firms are more likely to adopt new stock option plans when they are more (less) owned by arms-length investors (stable and controlling shareholders). Those firms have significantly more independent boards and pay higher dividends surrounding the adoption year than their industry peers. These results suggest that firms adopting stock options endeavor to meet demands for good governance practice from arms-length shareholders and to follow good governance practices in other dimensions. The coexistence of arms-length, stable, and controlling shareholders generates a situation in which stock options are not widely used in Japan.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85006317878&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85006317878&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1017/S0022109016000636

DO - 10.1017/S0022109016000636

M3 - Article

VL - 51

SP - 1719

EP - 1738

JO - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

JF - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis

SN - 0022-1090

IS - 5

ER -