Social decision with minimal efficiency loss: An automated mechanism design approach

Mingyu Guo, Hong Shen, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We study the problem where a group of agents need to choose from a finite set of social outcomes. We assume every agent's valuation for every outcome is bounded and the bounds are public information. For our model, no mechanism simultaneously satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-deficit, and efficiency. In light of this, we aim to design mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, non-deficit, and minimize the worst-case efficiency loss. We propose a family of mechanisms called the shifted Groves mechanisms, which are generalizations of the Groves mechanisms. We first show that if there exist mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, and non-deficit, then there exist shifted Groves mechanisms with these properties. Our main result is an Automated Mechanism Design (AMD) approach for identifying the (unique) optimal shifted Groves mechanism, which minimizes the worst-case efficiency loss among all shifted Groves mechanisms. Finally, we prove that the optimal shifted Groves mechanism is globally optimal among all deterministic mechanisms that are strategy-proof, individually rational, and non-deficit.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルAAMAS 2015 - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
出版社International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
ページ347-355
ページ数9
1
ISBN(電子版)9781450337694
出版ステータス出版済み - 2015
イベント14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015 - Istanbul, トルコ
継続期間: 5 4 20155 8 2015

その他

その他14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015
国/地域トルコ
CityIstanbul
Period5/4/155/8/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能
  • ソフトウェア
  • 制御およびシステム工学

引用スタイル