Stable and envy-free partitions in hedonic games

Nathanaël Barrot, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: 書籍/レポート タイプへの寄稿会議への寄与

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we study coalition formation in hedonic games through the fairness criterion of envy-freeness. Since the grand coalition is always envy-free, we focus on the conjunction of envy-freeness with stability notions. We first show that, in symmetric and additively separable hedonic games, an individually stable and justified envy-free partition may not exist and deciding its existence is NP-complete. Then, we prove that the top responsiveness property guarantees the existence of a Pareto optimal, individually stable, and envy-free partition, but it is not sufficient for the conjunction of core stability and envy-freeness. Finally, under bottom responsiveness, we show that deciding the existence of an individually stable and envy-free partition is NP-complete, but a Pareto optimal and justified envy-free partition always exists.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルProceedings of the 28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
編集者Sarit Kraus
出版社International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
ページ67-73
ページ数7
ISBN(電子版)9780999241141
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2019
イベント28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019 - Macao, 中国
継続期間: 8月 10 20198月 16 2019

出版物シリーズ

名前IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
2019-August
ISSN(印刷版)1045-0823

会議

会議28th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2019
国/地域中国
CityMacao
Period8/10/198/16/19

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能

引用スタイル