Stigma model of welfare fraud and non-take-up: Theory and evidence from OECD panel data

Kenichi Kurita, Nobuaki Hori, Yuya Katafuchi

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

抄録

This paper attempts to challenge two puzzles in the welfare program. The first puzzle is “non-take-up welfare,” which occurs when needy people do not take up welfare. Second, in some countries, the benefit level is high, but the recipient ratio is low; while the other nations have lower benefit levels but higher recipient ratios. We present a model of welfare stigma in which both non-take-up and welfare fraud exist within the equilibrium. This shows the possibility for the recipient ratio to decrease as the benefit level increases in the comparative statics. Our empirical results are consistent with our theoretical results.

本文言語英語
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Economic Theory
DOI
出版ステータス受理済み/印刷中 - 2020

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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