Strategic issues in college admissions with score-limits

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

抄録

We consider strategic problems in college admissions with score-limits introduced by Biró and Kiselgof. We first consider the problem of deciding whether a given applicant can cheat the algorithm of Biró and Kiselgof so that this applicant is assigned to a more preferable college. We prove its polynomial-time solvability. In addition, we consider the situation in which all applicants strategically behave. We prove that a Nash equilibrium always exists, and we can find one in polynomial time.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)105-108
ページ数4
ジャーナルOperations Research Letters
45
2
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 3 1 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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