Strategy-proof and non-wasteful multi-unit auction via social network

Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanaël Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit, non-wastefulness, and individual rationality for the multi-unit unit-demand auction, except for some naïve ones. In this paper, we first propose a mechanism that satisfies all the above properties. We then make a comprehensive comparison with two naïve mechanisms, showing that the proposed mechanism dominates them in social surplus, seller's revenue, and incentive of buyers for truth-telling. We also analyze the characteristics of the social surplus and the revenue achieved by the proposed mechanism, including the constant approximability of the worst-case efficiency loss and the complexity of optimizing revenue from the seller's perspective.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルAAAI 2020 - 34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
出版社AAAI Press
ページ2062-2069
ページ数8
ISBN(電子版)9781577358350
出版ステータス出版済み - 2020
イベント34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2020 - New York, 米国
継続期間: 2 7 20202 12 2020

出版物シリーズ

名前AAAI 2020 - 34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

会議

会議34th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2020
国/地域米国
CityNew York
Period2/7/202/12/20

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能

引用スタイル