Strategy/false-name proof protocols for combinatorial multi-attribute procurement auction: Handling arbitrary utility of the buyer

Takayuki Suyama, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: 書籍/レポート タイプへの寄稿会議への寄与

抄録

In this paper, we develop new protocols for a combinatorial, multi-attribute procurement auction in which each sales item (task) is defined by several attributes called quality, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. Furthermore, there exist multiple tasks, and both buyer and sellers can have arbitrary (e.g., complementary/substitutable) preferences on a bundle of tasks. In this setting, there is a chance that a VCG protocol cannot satisfy Individual Rationality (IR) for the buyer, i.e., the buyer's utility can be negative. We show that if a surplus function is concave, then the VCG protocol satisfies IR and the protocol is also false-name-proof, i.e., using multiple identifiers provides no advantage. Furthermore, we present a modification of the VCG protocol that satisfies IR even if the concavity condition is not satisfied. The key idea of this protocol is to introduce a special type of bidder called the reference bidder. We assume that the auctioneer knows the upper-bound of the reference bidder's cost. Introducing such a reference bidder is similar to setting reservation prices in standard combinatorial auctions. Furthermore, we develop a new false-name-proof protocol that is based on the idea of the Leveled Division Set (LDS) protocol.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルInternet and Network Economics - First International Workshop, WINE 2005, Proceedings
ページ278-287
ページ数10
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2005
イベント1st International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2005 - Hong Kong, 中国
継続期間: 12月 15 200512月 17 2005

出版物シリーズ

名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
3828 LNCS
ISSN(印刷版)0302-9743
ISSN(電子版)1611-3349

その他

その他1st International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2005
国/地域中国
CityHong Kong
Period12/15/0512/17/05

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 理論的コンピュータサイエンス
  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)

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