The effect of false-name bids in first price auctions

Atsushi Katsuragi, Yuko Sakurai, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿学術誌査読

抄録

This paper provides a numerical analysis of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in first-price combinatorial auctions, where participants/agents can use false-name bids. False-name bids is ones submitted by a single agent which uses multiple fictitious names, such as multiple e-mail addresses. It is well-known that even the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is influenced by the false-name bids. However, it is not so far investigated how false-name bids affects outcomes of first-price combinatorial auctions, which are widely used in realistic settings. This paper shed a light on the effect of false-name bids in first-price combinatorial auctions, by utilizing Bayesian Nash equilibrium concept via theoretical and numerical analysis.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)199-207
ページ数9
ジャーナルTransactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence
26
1
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2011

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • ソフトウェア
  • 人工知能

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