TY - JOUR
T1 - The effects of anti-takeover measures on Japanese corporations
AU - Yeh, Tsung ming
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgments The author is grateful to the critical and beneficial comments from the anonymous referee, the editor of Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Prof. Yasuo Hoshino, Prof. Jerry Platt, Prof. Hajime Ushimaru, Prof. Takeshi Sato, Prof. Linyu Zhai, Prof. Hiroya Ichikawa, Prof. Clay Williams, as well as the participants at the 19th Annual Conference on Pacific Basin Finance, Economics, Accounting, and Management (2011), a seminar sponsored by Japan’s Tohoku Certified Tax Accountants’ Association (2011), the 34th National Conference of Japan Finance Association (2010), and the 12th National Conference of Japanese Association of Administrative Science (2009). This research project received Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research from Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, and research grants from Akita International University.
Copyright:
Copyright 2014 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2014/5
Y1 - 2014/5
N2 - This study examines 130 Japanese firms that announced and adopted pre-warning anti-takeover measures between 2005 and 2007. Consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, the announcement-associated abnormal returns are negative and statistically significant. An examination of the relationship between the abnormal returns and the firm's ownership structure also supports the signaling hypothesis. The abnormal returns are positively related to the managerial shareholding variable as the managerial shareholding variable ranges from near-zero to an intermediate level; however, the relationship becomes negative as managerial shareholding increases past intermediate levels. Nevertheless, further examination of the post-adoption operating performance shows no significant trend towards deterioration as is predicted by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. The results primarily support the signaling hypothesis: Japanese managers adopt anti-takeover measures mainly to deter hostile takeovers, and the anti-takeover measures, per se, do not fundamentally affect managerial behaviors.
AB - This study examines 130 Japanese firms that announced and adopted pre-warning anti-takeover measures between 2005 and 2007. Consistent with the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, the announcement-associated abnormal returns are negative and statistically significant. An examination of the relationship between the abnormal returns and the firm's ownership structure also supports the signaling hypothesis. The abnormal returns are positively related to the managerial shareholding variable as the managerial shareholding variable ranges from near-zero to an intermediate level; however, the relationship becomes negative as managerial shareholding increases past intermediate levels. Nevertheless, further examination of the post-adoption operating performance shows no significant trend towards deterioration as is predicted by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. The results primarily support the signaling hypothesis: Japanese managers adopt anti-takeover measures mainly to deter hostile takeovers, and the anti-takeover measures, per se, do not fundamentally affect managerial behaviors.
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U2 - 10.1007/s11156-013-0361-0
DO - 10.1007/s11156-013-0361-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84898015168
VL - 42
SP - 757
EP - 780
JO - Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
JF - Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
SN - 0924-865X
IS - 4
ER -