Theory of internet auctions

Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai, Shigeo Matsubara

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

抄録

This paper analyzes the effects of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. If there exists no false-name bid, the generalized Vickrey Auction protocol (GVA) satisfies incentive compatibility, Pareto efficiency, and individual rationality. However, if false-name bids are possible, the GVA, nor any combinatorial auction protocol fails to satisfy these three properties at the same time. We developed a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Leveled Division Set (LDS) protocol that satisfies incentive compatibility and individual rationality, and can achieve the social surplus that is very close to Pareto efficient.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)759-764
ページ数6
ジャーナルNTT R and D
51
10
出版ステータス出版済み - 1 1 2002
外部発表はい

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 電子工学および電気工学

フィンガープリント

「Theory of internet auctions」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル