Transfers in international environmental agreements under heterogeneity

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

抄録

This paper analytically compares the effectiveness of internal and external transfers in encouraging participants in international environmental agreements (IEAs). We divide countries into two homogeneous groups: developed and developing countries. Further, we assume that strong asymmetries exist in their abatement benefits and costs. Using the non-cooperative game model of coalition formation, our result shows that both types of transfers can enlarge the size of self-enforcing coalitions, and the external transfers are always preferred.

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)3899-3910
ページ数12
ジャーナルApplied Economics
53
33
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 2021

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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