Two-Sided Matching over Social Networks

Sung Ho Cho, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: 書籍/レポート タイプへの寄稿会議への寄与

抄録

A new paradigm of mechanism design, called mechanism design over social networks, investigates agents' incentives to diffuse the information of mechanisms to their followers over social networks. In this paper we consider it for two-sided matching, where the agents on one side, say students, are distributed over social networks and thus are not fully observable to the mechanism designer, while the agents on the other side, say colleges, are known a priori. The main purpose of this paper is to clarify the existence of mechanisms that satisfy several properties that are classified into four criteria: incentive constraints, efficiency constraints, stability constraints, and fairness constraints. We proposed three mechanisms and showed that no mechanism is better than these mechanisms, i.e., they are in the Pareto frontier according to the set of properties defined in this paper.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトルProceedings of the 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2022
編集者Luc De Raedt, Luc De Raedt
出版社International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
ページ186-193
ページ数8
ISBN(電子版)9781956792003
出版ステータス出版済み - 2022
イベント31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2022 - Vienna, オーストリア
継続期間: 7月 23 20227月 29 2022

出版物シリーズ

名前IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
ISSN(印刷版)1045-0823

会議

会議31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 2022
国/地域オーストリア
CityVienna
Period7/23/227/29/22

!!!All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能

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