Two-stage n-person prisoner's dilemma with social preferences

Seiji Takanashi, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

抄録

We examine two-stage games where all players choose the parameters of social preferences at the first stage and play the n-person prisoner's dilemma at the second stage with perfect and imperfect information. This model expresses situations where players can choose how much they depend on the other players' payoffs. In this model, we get the following results. If the game has perfect information, cooperation among all players can be attained in an equilibrium by punishing a deviating player. If each player plays the n-person prisoner's dilemma without knowing the choices of the other players at the first stage, cooperation among a constant number of players can be attained in an equilibrium. In addition, we study two-stage games where all players choose how much they are concerned with the social welfare at the first stage and play the n-person prisoner's dilemma at the second stage. We show that when the players are more concerned with the minimum payoff, the number of players who cooperate at the second stage in an equilibrium weakly decreases.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトル18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
出版社International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
ページ2206-2208
ページ数3
ISBN(電子版)9781510892002
出版ステータス出版済み - 1 1 2019
イベント18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019 - Montreal, カナダ
継続期間: 5 13 20195 17 2019

出版物シリーズ

名前Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
4
ISSN(印刷版)1548-8403
ISSN(電子版)1558-2914

会議

会議18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019
国/地域カナダ
CityMontreal
Period5/13/195/17/19

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能
  • ソフトウェア
  • 制御およびシステム工学

引用スタイル