抄録
In this paper, we develop a new class of iterative mechanisms called a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism. To guarantee that sincere strategies are an ex post equilibrium, it inevitably asks an irrelevant query, in which a participant has no incentive to answer the query sincerely. Such an irrelevant query causes unnecessary leakage of private information and a different incentive issue. In a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, the mechanism achieves the same allocation as VCG, but the transfers are the same as VCG only in expectation. We show that in a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, sincere strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium. Also, we develop a general procedure for constructing a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that does not ask any irrelevant query. To demonstrate the applicability of this idea in a practical application, we develop a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that can be applied to the Japanese 4G spectrum auction.
| 元の言語 | 英語 |
|---|---|
| ページ（範囲） | 156-167 |
| ページ数 | 12 |
| ジャーナル | Computer Software |
| 巻 | 31 |
| 発行部数 | 3 |
| 出版物ステータス | 出版済み - 8 1 2014 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Software
これを引用
VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism. / Fujita, Etsushi; Todo, Taiki; Yokoo, Makoto; Iwasaki, Atsushi.
：: Computer Software, 巻 31, 番号 3, 01.08.2014, p. 156-167.研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿 › 記事
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism
AU - Fujita, Etsushi
AU - Todo, Taiki
AU - Yokoo, Makoto
AU - Iwasaki, Atsushi
PY - 2014/8/1
Y1 - 2014/8/1
N2 - In this paper, we develop a new class of iterative mechanisms called a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism. To guarantee that sincere strategies are an ex post equilibrium, it inevitably asks an irrelevant query, in which a participant has no incentive to answer the query sincerely. Such an irrelevant query causes unnecessary leakage of private information and a different incentive issue. In a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, the mechanism achieves the same allocation as VCG, but the transfers are the same as VCG only in expectation. We show that in a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, sincere strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium. Also, we develop a general procedure for constructing a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that does not ask any irrelevant query. To demonstrate the applicability of this idea in a practical application, we develop a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that can be applied to the Japanese 4G spectrum auction.
AB - In this paper, we develop a new class of iterative mechanisms called a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism. To guarantee that sincere strategies are an ex post equilibrium, it inevitably asks an irrelevant query, in which a participant has no incentive to answer the query sincerely. Such an irrelevant query causes unnecessary leakage of private information and a different incentive issue. In a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, the mechanism achieves the same allocation as VCG, but the transfers are the same as VCG only in expectation. We show that in a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, sincere strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium. Also, we develop a general procedure for constructing a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that does not ask any irrelevant query. To demonstrate the applicability of this idea in a practical application, we develop a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that can be applied to the Japanese 4G spectrum auction.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84907155608&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84907155608&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84907155608
VL - 31
SP - 156
EP - 167
JO - Computer Software
JF - Computer Software
SN - 0289-6540
IS - 3
ER -