VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism: General framework for constructing iterative combinatorial auction mechanisms

Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Miao Yao, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Contribution to conferencePaper査読

2 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we develop a new class of iterative mechanisms called a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism. Iterative auctions are preferred over their sealed-bid counterparts in practical settings, since they can avoid full revelation of type information. However, to guarantee that sincere strategies are an ex post equilibrium, the mechanism needs to achieve exactly the same outcome as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. To guarantee that a mechanism is VCG-equivalent, it inevitably asks an irrelevant query, in which a participant has no incentive to answer the query sincerely. Such an irrelevant query causes unnecessary leakage of private information and a different incentive issue. In a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, the mechanism achieves the same allocation as VCG, but the transfers are the same as VCG only in expectation. We show that in a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism, sincere strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium. Also, we develop a general procedure for constructing a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that does not ask any irrelevant query. To demonstrate the applicability of this idea in a practical application, we develop a VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism that can be applied to the Japanese 4G spectrum auction.

本文言語英語
ページ699-706
ページ数8
出版ステータス出版済み - 2013
イベント12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013 - Saint Paul, MN, 米国
継続期間: 5 6 20135 10 2013

その他

その他12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems 2013, AAMAS 2013
国/地域米国
CitySaint Paul, MN
Period5/6/135/10/13

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能

引用スタイル