Weighted matching markets with budget constraints

Naoto Hamada, Anisse Ismaili, Takamasa Suzuki, Makoto Yokoo

研究成果: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

9 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We investigate markets with a set of students on one side and a set of colleges on the other. A student and college can be linked by a weighted contract that defines the student's wage, while a college's budget for hiring students is limited. Stability is a crucial requirement for matching mechanisms to be applied in the real world. A standard stability requirement is coalitional stability, i.e., no pair of a college and group of students has incentive to deviate. We find that a coalitionally stable matching is not guaranteed to exist, verifying the coalitional stability for a given matching is coXP- complete, and the problem to find whether a coalitionally stable matching exists in a given market, is NPNP-complete (that is Ef-complete). Given these computational hardness results, we pursue a weaker stability requirement called pairwise stability, i.e., no pair of a college and single student has incentive to deviate. We then design a strategy-proof mechanism that works in polynomial-Time for computing a pairwise stable matching in typed markets in which students are partitioned into types that induce their possible wages.

本文言語英語
ホスト出版物のタイトル16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
編集者Edmund Durfee, Sanmay Das, Kate Larson, Michael Winikoff
出版社International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)
ページ317-325
ページ数9
ISBN(電子版)9781510855076
出版ステータス出版済み - 1 1 2017
イベント16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017 - Sao Paulo, ブラジル
継続期間: 5 8 20175 12 2017

出版物シリーズ

名前Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS
1
ISSN(印刷版)1548-8403
ISSN(電子版)1558-2914

その他

その他16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017
国/地域ブラジル
CitySao Paulo
Period5/8/175/12/17

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 人工知能
  • ソフトウェア
  • 制御およびシステム工学

フィンガープリント

「Weighted matching markets with budget constraints」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル