TY - GEN

T1 - Weighted matching markets with budget constraints

AU - Hamada, Naoto

AU - Ismaili, Anisse

AU - Suzuki, Takamasa

AU - Yokoo, Makoto

PY - 2017/1/1

Y1 - 2017/1/1

N2 - We investigate markets with a set of students on one side and a set of colleges on the other. A student and college can be linked by a weighted contract that defines the student's wage, while a college's budget for hiring students is limited. Stability is a crucial requirement for matching mechanisms to be applied in the real world. A standard stability requirement is coalitional stability, i.e., no pair of a college and group of students has incentive to deviate. We find that a coalitionally stable matching is not guaranteed to exist, verifying the coalitional stability for a given matching is coXP- complete, and the problem to find whether a coalitionally stable matching exists in a given market, is NPNP-complete (that is Ef-complete). Given these computational hardness results, we pursue a weaker stability requirement called pairwise stability, i.e., no pair of a college and single student has incentive to deviate. We then design a strategy-proof mechanism that works in polynomial-Time for computing a pairwise stable matching in typed markets in which students are partitioned into types that induce their possible wages.

AB - We investigate markets with a set of students on one side and a set of colleges on the other. A student and college can be linked by a weighted contract that defines the student's wage, while a college's budget for hiring students is limited. Stability is a crucial requirement for matching mechanisms to be applied in the real world. A standard stability requirement is coalitional stability, i.e., no pair of a college and group of students has incentive to deviate. We find that a coalitionally stable matching is not guaranteed to exist, verifying the coalitional stability for a given matching is coXP- complete, and the problem to find whether a coalitionally stable matching exists in a given market, is NPNP-complete (that is Ef-complete). Given these computational hardness results, we pursue a weaker stability requirement called pairwise stability, i.e., no pair of a college and single student has incentive to deviate. We then design a strategy-proof mechanism that works in polynomial-Time for computing a pairwise stable matching in typed markets in which students are partitioned into types that induce their possible wages.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85031911946&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85031911946&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85031911946

T3 - Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

SP - 317

EP - 325

BT - 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017

A2 - Durfee, Edmund

A2 - Das, Sanmay

A2 - Larson, Kate

A2 - Winikoff, Michael

PB - International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS)

T2 - 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2017

Y2 - 8 May 2017 through 12 May 2017

ER -