What controls network reciprocity in the Prisoner's Dilemma game?

Atsuo Yamauchi, Jun Tanimoto, Aya Hagishima

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

32 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

The evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game in structured networks has been studied extensively to understand network reciprocity. However, in some cases results of these studies cannot be compared because not only the network structures but also the network parameters, rules for updating strategies, and update dynamics differ among them. In this study, we investigated the effect of experimental conditions by conducting a series of systematic factorial experiments. We found that those experimental assumptions are significantly important in network reciprocity, although we confirmed that network reciprocity can be basically explained by the average degree of the network (Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006).

元の言語英語
ページ(範囲)82-87
ページ数6
ジャーナルBioSystems
102
発行部数2-3
DOI
出版物ステータス出版済み - 11 1 2010

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Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Reciprocity
Experiments
Factorial Experiment
Evolutionary Game
Network Structure
Updating
Prisoner Dilemma
Update
Series

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

これを引用

What controls network reciprocity in the Prisoner's Dilemma game? / Yamauchi, Atsuo; Tanimoto, Jun; Hagishima, Aya.

:: BioSystems, 巻 102, 番号 2-3, 01.11.2010, p. 82-87.

研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿記事

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