What controls network reciprocity in the Prisoner's Dilemma game?

Atsuo Yamauchi, Jun Tanimoto, Aya Hagishima

研究成果: Contribution to journalArticle査読

38 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma game in structured networks has been studied extensively to understand network reciprocity. However, in some cases results of these studies cannot be compared because not only the network structures but also the network parameters, rules for updating strategies, and update dynamics differ among them. In this study, we investigated the effect of experimental conditions by conducting a series of systematic factorial experiments. We found that those experimental assumptions are significantly important in network reciprocity, although we confirmed that network reciprocity can be basically explained by the average degree of the network (Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006).

本文言語英語
ページ(範囲)82-87
ページ数6
ジャーナルBioSystems
102
2-3
DOI
出版ステータス出版済み - 11 2010

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • 統計学および確率
  • モデリングとシミュレーション
  • 生化学、遺伝学、分子生物学(全般)
  • 応用数学

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