抄録
A marketable permit system (MPS) has been suggested as a solution to environmental problems. Although the properties of MPSs under non-trader settings, in which each player is exclusively either a seller or a buyer, are well documented, little research has explored how MPSs perform under trader settings, in which each player can be both a seller and a buyer. We institute two auctions of trader settings in MPS experiments: a double auction (DA) and a uniform price auction (UPA). We then evaluate and compare their performances both with each other and with those under non-trader settings. The main results are as follows: DAs under trader settings perform much worse than do DAs under non-trader settings, whereas UPAs perform well, regardless of the trader and non-trader settings. UPAs are more efficient and generate more stable prices than do DAs under trader settings, and a considerable proportion of trades in DAs under trader settings consist of “flips” that could be considered speculation or errors. Thus, UPAs are likely to work better than DAs under trader settings.
| 元の言語 | 英語 |
|---|---|
| ページ（範囲） | 247-267 |
| ページ数 | 21 |
| ジャーナル | Experimental Economics |
| 巻 | 22 |
| 発行部数 | 1 |
| DOI | |
| 出版物ステータス | 出版済み - 3 15 2019 |
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All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
これを引用
Which performs better under trader settings, double auction or uniform price auction? / Kotani, Koji; Tanaka, Kenta; Managi, Shunsuke.
：: Experimental Economics, 巻 22, 番号 1, 15.03.2019, p. 247-267.研究成果: ジャーナルへの寄稿 › 記事
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Which performs better under trader settings, double auction or uniform price auction?
AU - Kotani, Koji
AU - Tanaka, Kenta
AU - Managi, Shunsuke
PY - 2019/3/15
Y1 - 2019/3/15
N2 - A marketable permit system (MPS) has been suggested as a solution to environmental problems. Although the properties of MPSs under non-trader settings, in which each player is exclusively either a seller or a buyer, are well documented, little research has explored how MPSs perform under trader settings, in which each player can be both a seller and a buyer. We institute two auctions of trader settings in MPS experiments: a double auction (DA) and a uniform price auction (UPA). We then evaluate and compare their performances both with each other and with those under non-trader settings. The main results are as follows: DAs under trader settings perform much worse than do DAs under non-trader settings, whereas UPAs perform well, regardless of the trader and non-trader settings. UPAs are more efficient and generate more stable prices than do DAs under trader settings, and a considerable proportion of trades in DAs under trader settings consist of “flips” that could be considered speculation or errors. Thus, UPAs are likely to work better than DAs under trader settings.
AB - A marketable permit system (MPS) has been suggested as a solution to environmental problems. Although the properties of MPSs under non-trader settings, in which each player is exclusively either a seller or a buyer, are well documented, little research has explored how MPSs perform under trader settings, in which each player can be both a seller and a buyer. We institute two auctions of trader settings in MPS experiments: a double auction (DA) and a uniform price auction (UPA). We then evaluate and compare their performances both with each other and with those under non-trader settings. The main results are as follows: DAs under trader settings perform much worse than do DAs under non-trader settings, whereas UPAs perform well, regardless of the trader and non-trader settings. UPAs are more efficient and generate more stable prices than do DAs under trader settings, and a considerable proportion of trades in DAs under trader settings consist of “flips” that could be considered speculation or errors. Thus, UPAs are likely to work better than DAs under trader settings.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85051250350&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10683-018-9585-0
DO - 10.1007/s10683-018-9585-0
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85051250350
VL - 22
SP - 247
EP - 267
JO - Experimental Economics
JF - Experimental Economics
SN - 1386-4157
IS - 1
ER -